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LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE
AVIATION INDUSTRY 1981-1982
CARROLL E. DUBUC* AND LOUISE B. DOCTOR**
T HERE HAVE BEEN three major developments in the
last year which have the potential to affect aviation insur-
ance practices as well as aviation litigation in the future. The
passage of the Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981
("Risk Retention Act")' may affect the insurance formats of
some of the manufacturers of aircraft and component parts.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended that
the Senate give its advice and consent to the Montreal (Gua-
temala) Protocols, ("Montreal Protocols" or "Protocols") 2
which are the proposed amendments to the international trea-
ties governing procedures and limitations of liability. Al-
though the Protocols did not reach a floor vote in the Senate
during the closing days of the 97th Congress, Protocols Three
and Four have once again been reported out by the Foreign
*Resident Partner, Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley & Casey,
Washington, D.C.. Mr. Dubuc is counsel of record to the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) in connection with IATA's petition to intervene in the Supreme
Court of the United States in Franklin Mint Corp. v. TWA.
**Associate, Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley & Casey, Wash-
ington, D. C.
' Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-45, 95 Stat. 949
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3904 (Supp. 1981)). H.R. 2120, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981), which became the Risk Retention Act, was essentially a reintroduction
of H.R. 6152, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in Dubuc & Jones, Significant
Legislative Developments in 1979 in the Field of Aviation Law, 45 J. AIR L. & COM.,
921, 932 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Dubuc & Jones].
I REPORT OF THE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. SENATE, ON EXECUTIVE B.,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., S. REP. No. 45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981). See also Dubuc &
Jones, supra note 1 at 958.
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Relations Committee ("Committee")in the 98th Congress.3
However, after several hours of debate in a floor vote on
March 8th 1983, the United States Senate failed to approve
the Protocols by the neccessary two thirds majority; The vote
was 50 for to 42 against with one "present" vote and seven
absent." Although a motion to reconsider was made,5 the cur-
rent thinking is that rengotiation of the limitation will proba-
bly precede any such vote. The Civil Aeronautics Board
("CAB") adopted new rules that increase the insurance cover-
age required for U.S. and foreign carriers operating air trans-
portation, to and from the United States, thereby affecting
the cost and sources of insurance coverage for the airline
industry.'
Several other bills of potential significance to the aviation
industry were also introduced in the 97th Congress, the most
notable of which are the various uniform product liability
bills, including (i) the Uniform Product Liability Act (the
"Kasten Bill")', which was introduced in the United States
Senate and would adopt a form of uniform product liability
while restricting jurisdiction to the state courts and (ii) the
Danielson Bills , a holdover bill, which would create a federal
cause of action for aviation disasters. Both of these bills will
probably be considered in the 98th Congress. The Kasten Bill
has already been reintroduced, and the Danielson Bill, al-
though not yet introduced in the 98th Congress, has been the
subject of hearings chaired by Representative Sam B. Hall,
who succeeded Mr. Danielson as chairman of the subcommit-
129 Cong. Rec. D79 (Daily ed. Feb.3, 1983).
129 Cong. Rec. S 2279 (Daily ed. March 8, 1983).
Id.
Aircraft Accident Liability Insurance, 14 C.F.R. § 205 (1982).
7 S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The Uniform Product Liability Act has been
reintroduced in the 98th Congress as S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See also the
discussion of the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Interagency Task Force on Product Liabil-
ity, Final Report, NTIS, P.B. 273-220 (1977) in Dubuc, Significant Legislative Devel-
opments in the Field of Aviation Law, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Dubuc"]; Dubuc and Jones, supra note 1 at 922-33.
* H.R. 1027, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Although this legislation has not been
reintroduced as yet in the 98th Congress, the House Judiciary Committee's Subcom-
mittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations, under the leadership of
Rep. Sam B. Hall (D.Tex.), held hearings on the general subject on February 9, 1983.
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tee. At least one other proposal of significance to aviation, the
so-called Air Travel Protection Act,9 (ATPA) was circulated
in draft, and may be introduced in the 98th Congress.
Also, developments in case law, particularly the decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.10 and the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia," provide some grist
for comment and perhaps insight into the future problems
that might be engendered by some of the proposed legislation,
particularly in view of the Senate rejection of the Montreal
Protocols and the possible introduction of the ATPA. Several
other pending measures are relevant to the issues raised by
the Montreal Protocols and ATPA, and will be discussed in
that context.
I. PRODUCT LIABILITY RISK RETENTION ACT OF 1981
The Risk Retention Act allows the formation of risk reten-
tion groups under the law of any State of the United States,
Bermuda or the Cayman Islands for the purpose of permitting
product manufacturers to purchase insurance at more
favorable group rates or to form self-insurance cooperatives,
thus, theoretically reducing the cost of product liability insur-
ance." In order to qualify under the Risk Retention Act,
groups formed in Bermuda or the Cayman Islands must be
chartered prior to January 1, 1985, and must meet the capital-
ization requirements of at least one State.' 3 The Risk Reten-
" The draft version proposes a new Title XIV to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976). All references are to the September 25, 1981 draft
[hereinafter "ATPA Draft"].
"0 Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982)
reh'g denied, Dec. 1, 1982, petition for cert. filed, Jan. 17, 1983 (No. 82-1186) dis-
cussed infra at note 39.
" In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982), discussed infra
at note 45.
" 15 U.S.C. § 3901(a)(4). (Supp. 1981) defines risk retention group as "any corpo-
ration or other limited liability association taxable as a corporation, or as an insur-
ance company, formed under the laws of any State, Bermuda, or the Cayman Islands
" Id.
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tion Act exempts such associations from the operation of
State law to the extent that any law, rule, regulation or order
of a State would make unlawful or would regulate the opera-
tion of a risk retention group.14 The State in which the group
would be chartered, however, could require it to:
(A) comply with the unfair claim settlement practices law of
the State;
(B) pay, on a nondiscriminatory basis, applicable premium and
other taxes which are levied on admitted insurers and surplus
lines insurers, brokers, or policyholders under the laws of the
State;
(C) participate, on a nondiscriminatory basis, in any mecha-
nism established or authorized under the law of the State for
the equitable apportionment among insurers of product liabil-
ity or completed operations liability insurance losses and ex-
penses incurred on policies written through such mechanism;
(D) submit to the appropriate authority reports and other in-
formation required of licensed insurers under the laws of a
State relating solely to product liability or completed opera-
tions liability insurance losses and expenses;
(E) register with and designate the State insurance commis-
sioner as its agent solely for the purpose of receiving service of
legal documents or process."
The licensing State may also require risk retention groups
to submit to examinations as to their financial conditon, and
to comply with lawful orders issued in a delinquency proceed-
ing." Exemptions from State law requirements enable prod-
uct liability risk retention groups (i) to participate in insur-
ance insolvency guaranty associations, (ii) to obtain
countersignature of policies by an agent or broker residing in
the State, and (iii) to avoid any discriminatory provision of
state law.1"
The key provision of the Risk Retention Act appears to per-
mit risk retention groups, like insurance companies licensed
15 U.S.C. § 3902(a)(3) (Supp. 1981).
I ld.
Id.
15 U.S.C. §§ 3902(a)(2)-(4) (Supp. 1981).
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by various States, to apportion losses."8 Liberally translated,
the provision suggests that "accrued", but unpaid losses may
be treated as business expenses. This concept is not clear on
the face of the legislation, however, and may require imple-
menting state regulations in order to confirm such
interpretation.
The legislative history of section three of the Risk Reten-
tion Act relating to the apportionment of losses by risk reten-
tion groups states that the law was intended "to require a risk
retention group to bear a portion of the total exposure of the
risks insured through the mechanism, rather than accept out-
right assignment of an individual risk". 9 This leaves unan-
swered the question of whether accrued losses can be ex-
pensed. The ambiguity will undoubtedly be tested by any new
groups formed under the law, or may be resolved by State reg-
ulation. The implementation of the Risk Retention Act, along
with tax relief available under the loss carry-back provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code,20 may result in a change in the
industry's insurance structure by making such concepts prac-
tically viable, whereas prior proposals lacking this function
were economically unattractive.
To date, only Vermont has enacted enabling legislation for
the Risk Retention Act.2 The National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners, however, adopted a draft Model State
Act at its December, 1982 meeting.2
" 15 U.S.C. § 3(a)(1)(c) (Supp. 1981).
" H.R. REP. No. 97-190, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1981).
'o Dubuc, supra note 7, at 2-3.
" VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 6001 (1981).
" Model Product Liability Risk Retention Group Act ("Model Act"). The Model
Act provides for the chartering of risk retention groups as insurers under the State's
insurance laws (§ 3), and the registration of risk retention groups chartered in other
States, Bermuda or the Cayman Islands with the State insurance commission (§ 4).
Agents, brokers and other persons servicing risk retention groups would also be re-
quired to register with the State insurance commissioner (§ 5). It would appear that
by treating risk retention groups in the same manner as other insurers chartered or
registered under state law, the Model Act may allow for the expensing of accrued
losses. However, the Model Act also apparently subjects risk retention groups to all
state insurance regulations other than those specifically prohibited by the terms of
the Risk Retention Act. This may have a chilling effect on the formation of such
groups for precisely the reasons the Risk Retention Act was promulgated, namely the
need to conform to th laws of multiple jurisdictions in order to do business.
1983]
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II. MONTREAL (GUATEMALA) PROTOCOLS
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended
that the Senate ratify the Montreal Protocols,23 the most con-
troversial of which is Number Three, which would have
amended the Warsaw Convention ("Convention")" to in-
crease the limitation of liability for injury to or death of pas-
sengers of an airline performing international air transporta-
tion.26 Number Three, however, in a vote of the full Senate on
March 8th, 1983 failed to obtain the two-thirds vote necessary
for approval.26 Thus the exising Warsaw Convention ("Con-
vention") remains the law of the land. Under the provisions of
the Montreal Protocols the original Convention limitation of
approximately $8,300, which was increased in 1966 to
$75,0007, would have be increased to approximately $120,000
for personal injury or death claims regardless of fault.2 8 These
limits, however, would have been absolute and would have ab-
rogated Article 25 of the Convention.2 ' Article 25 presently
permits the limitation to be avoided by proof of willful mis-
conduct by the airline. 30 Montreal Protocol Number Three
also would have limited passenger baggage claims to approxi-
mately 1,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).5 ' Limitation for
U Exec. Rept No. 97-41, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (Dec. 9, 1981) and Exec. Rep 97-45,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (Dec. 16, 1981).
'4 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (Oct. 12, 1929).
Exec. Rep. No. 97-45, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 4-5 (Dec. 16, 1981).
's 129 Cong. Rec. S 2279 (Daily ed., March 8, 1983).
' The $75,000 limitation was established by the Montreal Agreement, CAB Agree-
ment 18900, approved by C.A.B. Order E-23680 (May 13, 1966), by which air carriers
waived the lower liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention.
" Montreal Protocol No. 3, Exec. Rep. No. 97-45, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. 11 (Dec. 16,
1981) provides for a limitation for passenger death or injury of 100,000 Special Draw-
ing Rights, which, when converted into United States dollars, amounted to approxi-
mately $107,466 on October 8, 1982. A Specal Drawing Right is a unit of account
established by the International Monetary Fund for the purpose of allowing a free
and stable unit of conversion among the world's currencies.
" Exec. Rep. No. 97-45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (Dec. 16, 1981).
*0 Article 25(1) of the Convention provides:"The carrier shall not be entitled to
avail himself of the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability,
if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct . .. ."
" Exec. Rep. No 97-45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. II (Dec. 16, 1981). This limitation
equaled approximately $1,075 United States dollars on October 8, 1982.
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cargo liability would have been changed to 17 SDRs per
kilogram. 2
In addition to increasing the limitation for personal injury
and death under the Convention, proposed Montreal Protocol
Nunber Three would amend the Convention to permit each
signatory country to establish a Supplemental Compensation
Plan for passenger liability.88 In 1977, the CAB approved a
Supplemental Compensation Plan which would provide ap-
proximately $200,000 for each present United States resident
or other passenger who purchased a ticket and paid a
surcharge in the United States. 4 Another provision of the
Montreal Protocols would have amended Article 28 of the
Convention to permit lawsuits in the United States against
any international airline which has an "establishment" in this
country if the passenger has his domicile or permanent resi-
dence in the United States. Thus, the number of available
court forums would have been expanded, presumably permit-
ting more passengers, regardless of their ticketing or national-
ity, to seek redress in United States courts. The existing Con-
vention, however, limits the forums."
The Committee reported favorably on the Montreal Proto-
cols to the Senate, recommending that the President be given
the power to adhere to them. This recommendation was quali-
fied, however as to Protocols Three and Four. The Committee
believed that before Protocols Three and Four came into
force, the President should determine that a satisfactory Sup-
plemental Compensation Plan was in effect. Thereafter the
President would have given notice of denunciation of these
Protocols if, at any time, a satisfactory Supplemental Coin-
32 Id. This limitation equaled approximately $18.17 in United States dollars per
kilogram on October 8, 1982.
"Id. This new provision would be added as Art. 35A to the Convention. Id.
'4 Order 77-7-85 (July 20, 1977).
88 Article 28 of the Convention currently limits jurisdiction to the carrier's domi-
cile, the carrier's principal place of business, the country through which the contract
of carriage was made, or the place of destination. Montreal Protocol Number Three,
Article 28 expands the jurisdiction to include the passenger's domicile or permanent
residence if the carrier has an establishment there. Exec. Rep. No. 97-45, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 28 (Dec. 16, 1981).
19831
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pensation Plan is not available in the United States.36 The
purpose of this language was to assure that the Plan remains
adequate under an assumed inflationary economy. The re-
maining three Montreal Protocols were recommended to the
Senate by the Foreign Relations Committee without qualifica-
tion by the 97th Congress, but have not been considered in
the 98th Congress.3 7 While the Administration strongly sup-
ported the Montreal Protocols, the controversial nature of
Protocols Three and Four and the opposition of the trial bar
to the perceived "low" absolute limitation of liability appar-
ently deterred affirmative votes by many members of the Sen-
ate." As noted above, opinions by two prestigious courts, the
Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal, may provide
some judicial insight into the problems and solutions ad-
dressed in the Montreal Protocols. In Franklin Mint Corp. v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc.'9 a case arising out of a lost cargo
" Exec. Rep. No. 97-45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (Dec. 16, 1981).
7 Of the five Montreal Protocols, Nos. One, Two and Five were technical amend-
ments. Executive N and 0 adopted a conformed text in Russian of the Chicago Con-
vention, 61 Stat. 1180 (1944). Treaty Document 97-4 allows the transfer of certain
functions under the Chicago Convention with respect to leased aircraft. Treaty Dc.
No. 97-4, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981). Montreal Protocols Three and Four require
additional action in the implementation of the Supplemental Compensation Plan
prior to their coming into force. Exec. Rep. No. 97-45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 16,
1981).
8 For example, in 1977 the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
("ABA"), after an active dialogue between different sections of the Association, favor-
ably endorsed the ratification of the Montreal Protocols. In August, 1982, the argu-
ment was rekindled by sections of the ABA seeking retraction of the original endorse-
ment. Nevertheless, the ABA affirmed its original endorsement. The rationale of the
ABA vote was based substantially on reluctance to change the original position, and
not on substantive considerations.
" Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1982),
reh'g denied (Dec. 1, 1982), petition for cert. filed, Jan 17, 1983 (No. 82-1186).The
Second Circuit suggested that the filing of tariffs may provide an interim solution.
See, e.g., United States v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); Blair v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 344 F.Supp. 360 (S.D. Fla.), afl'd, 477 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1973); Mao v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 310 F. Supp 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Progress Jewelry Co. v.
Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 300 F.Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Tishman & Lipp,
Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd, 413 F.2d 1401 (2d
Cir. 1969); Berkman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 209 F.Supp 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
Vogelsang v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 193 F.Supp 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), afl'd, 302 F.2d 709
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 826 (1962). It has already been argued, however, that
the thrust of the Franklin Mint opinion as to cargo loss should affect claims for per-
sonal injury and death with respect to travel to or from the United States. Such
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claim in which the Convention limitation of liability was a de-
fense, the Second Circuit held that the conversion of gold into
United States dollars at the last official price of gold would
govern the limitation of liability. The court, however, went be-
yond the precise issue presented and held that the present
Convention provisions limiting carrier liability for loss of
cargo would be unenforceable in the future because of (i) the
confusion engendered by the repeal of United States law set-
ting the official price of gold, (ii) the unratified proposal for
use of SDRs as the measure of the limitation in the Montreal
Protocols and, (iii) the lack of uniformity developing in other
world courts as to the question of the limitation and conver-
sion into local currency."' In light of the perceived need to
allow carriers time to amend their tariffs4 the court held that
its decision would not take effect for sixty days from the date
of the mandate.2
Other jurisdictions possibly may adopt the logic of the Sec-
ond Circuit decision with respect not only to cargo loss, but
also with respect to baggage loss, personal injury and death.
Of course, if this happens, there is no way to predict what
surgery those jurisdictions will perform on limitations of lia-
bility under the existing Convention.'
claims are governed presently by the Montreal Agreement, which sets a limitation of
$75,000 (substantially above the Convention limitation) and is filed with and ap-
proved by the CAB. See, In Re Aircrash at Kimpo International Airport, Korea on
November 18, 1980, M.D.L.-482, slip op. (D.Cal. Feb. 15, 1983), in which the court
held that the Montreal Agreement limiting liability for personal injury or death was
not enforceable in the case at bar.
40 Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1982), reh'g denied (Dec. 1, 1982),
petition for cert. filed, Jan. 17, 1983 (No.82-116).
'" The court apparently assumes that such amendments could be made.
42 The Second Circuit granted a stay until March 2, 1983 to allow petitions for
certiorari to be filed. Defendant TWA filed a petition on January 17, 1983. The
IATA, on its own behalf and on behalf of forty-three of its members, filed a motion
for leave to intervene and petition for certiorari on January 20, 1983. The Air Trans-
port Association has filed an amicus brief. A cross-petition for certiorari has been
filed on behalf of Franklin Mint.
" Indeed, the issue of how to convert the Convention gold limitations was decided
differently in Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc., 531 F.Supp. 344 (S.D.Tex. 1981), appeal filed, No. 81-2519 (5th Cir. Feb.
1, 1982). In that case the court used the free market price of gold in excess of $400
per ounce rather than defendant's tariff as the basis for converting the Convention's
French gold francs into local currency. If the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirms,
19831
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Reference to the Franklin Mint case was used to attempt to
convince the Senate that ratification of the Montreal Proto-
cols would solve some of the problems that may be created for
the airlines and the international transportation system as a
result of that decision. Alternatively, opponents of the Mon-
treal Protocols noted contrary arguments, and that dictum in
Franklin Mint suggested that the SDR limitation contained
in the Montreal Protocols may have some elements of indefi-
niteness 44 This dictum fosters prompt speculation of a future
court decision challenging that limitation. Also, in view of the
Senate's rejection of the Montreal Protocols, the need for re-
view of Franklin Mint by the Supreme Court of the United
States has been heightened.
The legal atmosphere has been further complicated by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a passenger death case, In
re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia." In that case, the plaintiff
sought to avoid the Convention limitation of liability, that
had been pleaded as a defense, by proving the willful miscon-
duct of the defendant.4" The court remanded the case for a
determination of whether there was willful misconduct on the
part of Pan American, thus avoiding an opportunity to inter-
pret the viability of the Convention limitations of liability for
death or personal injury.47 Although no retrial of the damage
issue was contemplated by the court, the opinion indicated
that in the event the lower court found that there had been no
willful misconduct by the carrier, it would not necessarily en-
there will be a clear conflict in the circuit courts thereby suggesting probable resolu-
tion by the Supreme Court of the United States. See also supra note 39 and accom-
panying text.
41 In Franklin Mint, Judge Winter remarked that even SDRs were dependent upon
the continuation of the International Monetary Fund and acceptance by the countries
belonging to the Fund of the SDR market basket concept. The court noted that the
basket of currencies through which the value of the SDR is calculated has been
changed once already, and that while the SDR is relatively stable in relation to the
free market price of gold, there is no guarantee that the SDR will remain a stable
method of converting the world's currencies. Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d 303, 310-11 (2d
Cir. 1982) reh'g denied Dec. 1, 1982, petition for cert. filed, Jan. 17, 1983 (No.82-
1186).
45 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1313.
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force the Convention limits."' If a retrial of the willful miscon-
duct issue produces a finding that no willful misconduct has
occurred, and the court subsequently enforces the Conven-
tion/Montreal Agreement limitations, then the plaintiffs, pur-
suant to a unique theory postulated by the Ninth Circuit,
would have a residual cause of action against the United
States Government under the Fifth Amendment, for a "tak-
ing" of the survivors' rights to assert a wrongful death claim
against the tortfeasor."' The court suggests that such a claim
might be filed in the Court of Claims" and also suggests gra-
s Id. at 1316.
"The court stated:
No party to this litigation has argued that the Warsaw Convention
limitation constitutes a "taking" that entitles plaintiffs to compensa-
tion by the United States under the just compensation clause of the
fifth amendment. We raised this issue sua sponte and requested sup-
plemental briefs from the parties for the reason that, if compensation
is available under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, we do not reach
the question of whether the Warsaw Convention is unconstitutional.
We first note that the "treaty exception " to the jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976), is not
a bar to suit by these plaintiffs in the Court of Claims. The exception
is applicable only where the right asserted is created by or depends for
its existence upon some treaty provision. That limitation has been nar-
rowly construed. The right asserted by the plaintiffs here arises under
California law, not treaty. The Court of Claims would therefore have
jurisdiction over any claim of "taking" of that right.
We next look to whether plaintiffs' wrongful death claims are "prop-
erty" within the meaning of the just compensation clause of the fifth
amendment. Plaintiffs have a right under California law to recover
damages caused by the wrongful death of their decedents. There is no
question that claims for compensation are property interests that can-
not be taken for public use without compensation. We can see no rea-
son why these plaintiffs' claims are any different, for fifth amendment
purposes, from the claims of various creditors against the government
of Iran.
Of course, whether or not a particular limitation amounts to a taking
is a difficult question. "Takings" cases frequently turn on questions of
degree. We need not decide now whether the Warsaw Convention may
effect a taking, because the issue may not arise in this case. The ques-
tion is properly one for the Court of Claims, when and if the Warsaw
Convention limitation is applied to these plaintiffs. [footnotes and ci-
tations omitted].
Id at 14-16.
" This question is strikingly similar to an argument recently adopted by the CAB
in its supplementary statement with respect to the elimination of one provision of the
1983]
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tuitously that the statute of limitations in the Court of Claims
tolled in the meantime.5' Although the Bali decision is com-
plex, it is relevant because another Circuit Court of Appeals
has questioned the viability of the Convention limitations and
perhaps has resurrected periodically argued historical ques-
tions concerning efforts to avoid limitations of liability. The
decision also opens the United States government to residual
liability indirectly in cases where limitations on liability are
imposed. These unforeseen legal developments suggest that
new issues may be raised in connection with the Warsaw Con-
vention and perhaps additional tinkering will be forthcoming
to preserve the limitations of liability contained therein in or-
der to survive anticipated future challenges."2
These two decisions highlight some of the difficulties facing
carriers today given the lack of an officially recognized price of
gold other than the free market price, and the problems cre-
ated by the Senate's rejection of the Montreal Protocols. For
Denied Boarding Compensation Rules. The provision previously allowed a carrier to
deny a passenger space on an overbooked aircraft if the government requisitioned the
seat. The CAB stated that the compensation provision was not so much to punish the
carrier for bumping the passenger, but to make the passenger whole for his inconve-
nience. The CAB went on to suggest that the carrier would have recourse to the gov-
ernment to recoup the entire cost of requisitioning the seat; in other words, the price
of the ticket sold to the government plus the price of the denied boarding compensa-
tion paid to the unlucky passenger. The CAB did not address the question of seeking
compensation from foreign governments which requisition space on fully booked
flights. CAB Dockets 39932, 36294, 39504: Draft Reg. 13 (Oct.7, 1982).
" Now, the statute of limitations would be tolled in the United States Claims
Court pursuant to the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164,
96 Stat. 25, 97th Cong., April 2, 1982.
52 For either an encouraging or discouraging look into yesteryear, see these cases
upholding the constitutionality of the Convention: Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, 152
F.Supp. 486 (D. N.J. 1957); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 58 F.
Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Garcia v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 269 A.D. 287
(1945), 55 N.Y.S. 2d 317, af'd, 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E. 2d 257, cert. denied, 329 U.S.
741 (1946). Decisions challenging the viability of the Convention are: Burdell v. Cana-
dian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 10 Avi. Cas. 18,151 (1968), Circuit Court Cook County, Ill.
(not officially reported and probably withdrawn). Although not on constitutional
grounds, the limitation of liability notices required by the Convention on a passenger
ticket were held unenforceable because they were inadequate in Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee
Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 253 F.Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968). The opponents of the Mon-
treal Protocols have articulated additional questions related to the totally unbreak-
able limitation.
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example, although the Montreal Protocols would have estab-
lished a higher single absolute limitation of liability through
the CAB Supplemental Compensation Plan, the issues ad-
dressed in Franklin Mint and Bali must still be resolved.53
Assuming that the SDR measure of limitation is viable, then
potential litigation against the United States in the U.S.
Claims Court possibly is precursed by the Bali court deci-
sion. 4 The proceedings in the Supreme Court should be inter-
esting and informative.
III AIR TRAVEL PROTECTION ACT
Although it was not introduced in the 97th Congress, a
draft version of the ATPA was circulated. The ATPA would
provide no-fault compensation for injuries or death arising out
of domestic aircraft accidents to accident victims who are resi-
dents of the United States. The ATPA governs the liability of
airlines, aircraft manufacturers and component manufactur-
ers.5 5 Although there is no limitation on the amount of liabil-
ity, the criteria for assessment of damages is quite definite,
including "economic detriment consisting of and limited to
the present value of" (i) medical services including vocational
rehabilitation, (ii) loss of income by an individual, (iii) cost of
replacement services, (iv) projected loss of income which a de-
cedent probably would have contributed to a survivor, (v) ex-
penses incurred by a survivor resulting from the loss of the
benefit of the decedent's services and (vi) expenses directly
B See supra notes 39 and 43.
" In the same context, the questions raised by these two circuit courts may also
affect the introduction of the ATPA which, as discussed infra at note 55, is intended
to integrate manufacturers into the limited liability status of the airlines for interna-
tional transportation. If, as the Second Circuit and particularly the Ninth Circuit
seem to indicate, there is a question as to whether the carriers can be protected by a
limitation of liability incorporated in a treaty without preserving a claim against the
government that enters into the treaty, will legislation provide adequate protection
for aircraft manufacturers which do not have the force of traditional concepts of limi-
tation of liability behind them? Indeed, even if the ATPA becomes law, now doubt-
ful, the problems created by these two circuit court decisions may be exacerbated by
the plaintiffs' bar in future challenges to the constitutionality of the Convention. It is
assumed that the Congress will integrate enough safeguards into the proposed legisla-
tion to make it viable against such challenges.
55 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1402(a).
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related to the decedent's funeral.5 "Governmental payments"
made under state or federal social security schemes or
worker's compensation plans and any "income tax saving"
would be deducted from the damage award."' The ATPA
would apply where the accident involved an aircraft of a
United States air carrier "during or arising out of the course
of domestic air commerce" and resulted in the death or hospi-
talization of five or more persons. s Although there is no ap-
parent limitation on recoveries within the parameters of the
ATPA, it appears that a "cap" on total recovery is included in
Section 1402(b) wherein the aggregate limit of liability of all
persons shall be the amount of financial protection (insur-
ance) provided by, or required to be provided by, the domes-
tic air carrier which operates the aircraft involved in the acci-
6 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1401(d).
5 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1401(d)(5).
6 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1401(a)(1). The definition of a "cognizable acci-
dent" as one which involves the death or injury of five or more persons is similar to
the definition in the Danielson bill, which proposes to establish a federal cause of
action for aviation activity. See. H.R. 1027, 97th Cong. 1st Sess., § 1364(a)(2) (1981).
Such distinctions may be valid, but challenges may be anticipated by claimants based
on Equal Protection arguments. In all cases decided under the ATPA, the liability of
each party will be limited to an amount determined by the Secretary of Transporta-
tion ("Secretary") under § 1402(c) to be equivalent to the amount of financial protec-
tion (including commercial insurance, contractual indemnification agreements and
self-insurance, or any combination thereof) reasonably available from private sources
to any domestic air carrier with respect to such risks. The criteria for this determina-
tion would be set by the Secretary, presumably after an opportunity for public com-
ment. The insured parties, that is, the domestic air carriers, the airframe manufactur-
ers, the engine manufacturers and air traffic control system suppliers, would be liable
to their suppliers of component parts, goods or services up to the limits of each in-
sured's respective liabilities. ATPA supra note 9 at § 1403(j). Any damages awards in
excess of the aggregate liability of the parties would be absorbed by the Surcharges
Advances Facility established pursuant to ATPA § 1402(d).
The Surcharges Advances Facility (SAF) is similar to the Supplemental Compensa-
tion Plan concept of the Montreal Protocols, discussed supra at note 34. The SAF
will be funded by a charge, in an amount to be determined by the Secretary, imposed
on each passenger ticket or air waybill in domestic air commerce. The Secretary will
be given the option of imposing the ticket surcharge prior to an aircraft accident,
thus creating a slush fund, or after an accident for which the Secretary determined
the aggregate liability of the insured parties might exceed the financial protection
required to be provided by them. In the latter case, the Secretary would presumably
have a better idea of how much money to collect to compensate the victims of the
accident. The SAF would also be used to satisfy claims of victims of terrorist inci-
dents in domestic air commerce, which would not otherwise be cognizable against an
air carrier under the ATPA pursuant to § 1402(c).
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dent.59 That amount is to be determined by the Secretary of
Transportation, pursuant to Section 1402(c)(1). Additional
amounts of recovery provided by the Surcharge Advances Fa-
cility, also are to be determined by the Secretary of
Transportation.60
Considering the Franklin Mint61 case, some legal questions
may have to be resolved on this issue. A no-fault action could
be brought in either a state or a federal court at any time
within two years of the date of the accident. A claimant would
have an absolute right to a jury trial62 by virtue of the ATPA's
preemption provision, § 1401(c).13
The ATPA would supersede all state laws, inconsistent pro-
visions of any Federal law and the law of any place not sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 4 Claims could be
asserted against the United States government, any state or
local governmental entity or any foreign state or instrumen-
tality thereof. 5 The ATPA, however, would not apply to
claims arising out of military hostilities, claims for apportion-
ment of damages, claims with respect to persons or property
being carried in international air commerce at the time of the
59 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1402(b).
60 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1402(c)(1).
6, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), reh'g denied, (Dec. 1, 1982), petition for cert. filed,
Jan. 17, 1983 (No. 82-1186).
62 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1404(d)(1). It should be noted, however, that under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunites Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976) and the follow-
ing court decisions interpreting this statute - Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de
Vapores "Inca Capac Yapanqui", 639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981) Verlinden, B.V. v. Cen-
tral Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. granted, -U.S.-., 102 S.Ct. 997 (1982); Herman v. El Al Israel Airlines,
Ltd., 502 F.Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) - a foreign airline substantially owned by a
foreign government is entitled to a trial without a jury in a federal court, and has a
right to remove any claims filed against it in state courts to the federal courts. In the
United States, no jury trial is permitted under the Federal Tort Claims
Act("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976). See Poston v. United States, 354 F. Supp.
480 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). However, ATPA § 1401(c)(2) provides that the right of action
granted under 1401(a) shall be maintainable notwithstanding any inconsistent provi-
sion of federal law, thereby purporting to amend the FTCA.
63 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1401(c). These exclusions would therefore make the
ATPA inapplicable to, among others, major military accidents, hijacking claims, and
foreign accidents where the air carrier cannot be or is not served in the United States.
64 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1403(g)(1).
66 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1404(b)(1)(A) and § 1404(b)(1)(c).
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accident, claims resulting from decreases in flight operations
by any aircraft not involved in the incident, claims for
worker's compensation benefits or claims under life, accident
or other insurance policies. 6 Persons who had made payments
under such laws or policies could assert claims for indemnifi-
cation. 7 Claims for punitive and exemplary damages would
also be barred."'
Recovery under the ATPA would not include compensation
for a decedent's pain and suffering or for any other non-eco-
nomic detriment. 9 Claims for pain and suffering by an in-
jured person would not be permitted unless that person sus-
tained serious and permanent disfigurement, other serious
and permanent injury or was totally disabled for a period of
more than ninety days.70 The treatment of claims for an in-
jured person's pain and suffering in cases where the plaintiff
dies from his injuries after the commencement of the action is
unclear in the draft version of the ATPA.
Both United States and foreign citizens would be entitled to
interim assistance payments, consisting of periodic payments
made for economic detriment resulting from the incident plus
out-of-pocket expenses incurred.7 ' Payments under the ATPA
would be the joint and several responsibility of the air carrier
or carriers and the airplane manufacturer or manufacturers
until such time as the contributing parties are designated by
the court in an apportionment action. 2 Ultimate liability for
both interim assistance payments and damage awards would
be determined by means of a contribution agreement similar
to the Tenerife agreement 7 8 between or among domestic air
ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1401(c)(3).
67 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1401(c)(3)(F).
ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1401(d).
ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1401(c)(3).
70 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1401(c).
" ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1401(0 and § 1401(g).
" ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1401(0(2).
'1 The Tenerife model arose out of the collision at Tenerife between a Pan Ameri-
can World Airways jet and a KLM Royal Dutch Airlines jet and involved an agree-
ment between the carriers to contribute to claims settlements in advance of a deter-
mination of liability and comparative fault. Thus, the potential defendants in the
actions were able to settle the vast majority of cases without resorting to litigation.
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carriers and manufacturers or, if such an agreement could not
be reached, by the institution of an apportionment action. No
provision is made for the commencement of an apportionment
action by a foreign air carrier. Foreign carriers, however, are
subject to process under the ATPA and are deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the United States courts by
virtue of their foreign air carrier permit.7 4 Additionally, the
ATPA will vest United States district courts with jurisdiction
over any person, without regard to citizenship, who was a
"substantial factor" in producing or contributing to a claim-
ant's injuries .7  Recovery by persons who were not citizens or
residents of the United States at the time of an accident will
be governed by the rules relating to damages for injury or
death prevailing in the jurisdiction of the claimant's residence
at the time of the incident, but cannot exceed damages recov-
erable by United States citizens or residents under the
ATPA.7
The defeat of the Montreal Protocols bodes ill for the
ATPA because they were apparently designed to be imple-
mented in tandem. 7 The no-fault provision of the ATPA,
while continuing the Warsaw/Guatamala scheme currently ap-
plicable to international claimants, apparently will make both
United States and foreign carriers engaged in international air
commerce strictly liable to domestic claimants where the un-
derlying incident involved two aircraft, one of which was en-
7' ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1404(c)(2). To date some courts have refused to
apply this jurisdictional extension. See, e.g., Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp.
264 (D.D.C. 1978), afj'd, 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979). As a practical matter, damages
awarded in the United States courts are probably higher than those awarded in most
other countries, but some legal attack by the plaintiff's bar should be anticipated.
Claimants may agree that the ATPA distinction between citizens and non-citizens
raises questions under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
and in certain instances, may violate the provisions of various treaties of friendship,
commerce and navigation between the United States and other nations.
75 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1404(c)(1).
7' ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1401(e). This provision would presumably elimi-
nate any action for punitive damages by a non-citizen or non-resident even though
punitive damages are available in his home jurisdiction. As a practical matter, puni-
tive damages are not usually awarded in most other countries, but again some legal
attack by the plaintiff's bar should be anticipated.
77 See supra notes 60 and 72.
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gaged in domestic air transportation, and the other of which
was engaged in international air commerce."'
As well as providing compensation for claimants, the ATPA
establishes an apportionment action to allocate responsibility
among joint tortfeasors.79 Pursuant to the ATPA, an appor-
tionment action will be tried without a jury, will be tried only
in a federal district court, and will be consolidated with other
apportionment actions arising out of the same incident 80 An
apportionment action can be commenced no sooner than
thirty days after the occurrence and not later than three years
after the date of the incident."s
Venue of the apportionment action will be determined by
the situs of the incident or, if the incident occurred outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, by the domes-
tic point of departure or point of destination of the aircraft. 2
Any party to the apportionment action will be entitled to pe-
tition the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation for trans-
fer of the action based on the convenience of the parties or
witnesses, or in the interest of justice.8 If such transfer were
ordered, all aspects of the action, including trial, will proceed
in the district court to which the action is transferred. 4
The plaintiff in an apportionment action will be required to
petition the court for a temporary apportionment order giving
effect to the terms of any provisional contribution agreement,
or if no such agreement existed, for an order designating the
contributing parties and assigning the proportionate responsi-
bility of each contributor.8 5 A special master will make find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law related to any motion for a
temporary apportionment order within 115 days of a refer-
76 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1401(d), which provides that "[riecovery for injury
or death in respect of any citizen or resident of the United States shall provide com-
pensation for economic detriment . ... " (emphasis added). See discussion of dam-
ages supra note 52 with respect for which the ATPA provides compensation.
79 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1403(a).
80 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1402(b)(2)-4(c).
ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1403(d).
*' ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1403(d).
' ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1403(d).
ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1403(d).
ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1403(e)(1).
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ence.86 Public disclosure of the terms of a provisional contri-
bution agreement will not be permitted except upon a finding
of good cause by the court.87 Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure governing third party practice will apply, but
only as to parties originally served with a petition for a tem-
porary apportionment order. 8 Any party to the action will be
allowed to seek court review of the special master's order,
which can be amended by the court or recommitted to the
special master if the court finds the special master made
"clear and substantial errors of fact or law" that will cause
"manifest injustice" to the parties. 9 The temporary appor-
tionment order will be interlocutory in character and will have
no precedential effect on the apportionment action. As addi-
tional evidence regarding liability becomes available, the order
can be modified by the court on petition of any party.1
Both temporary and final apportionment of liability will be
based on the comparative responsibility of each party.92 The
nature and quality of the conduct of each party and the ex-
tent of the causal relation between each party and the injury,
will be determined "as a matter of Federal common law rely-
ing on the consensus of decisions of courts of competent juris-
diction."9 This provision is similar to the language used in
the proposed Danielson Bill that would create a federal cause
of action for aviation activity.' At a preliminary hearing, the
reliance of H.R. 1027 on the language, a "consensus of deci-
" ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1403(e)(3)(B).
87 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1402(3)(2).
ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1402(e)(3)(B).
ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1402(e)(3)(C).
90 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1403(e)(3)(D).
91 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1403(e)(3)(D).
92 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1403(e)(3)(E).
98 ATPA Draft, supra note 9, § 1403(f)(2)(D). The phrase " as a matter of Federal
common law relying on the consensus of decisions of courts of competent jurisdic-
tion" may create some interpretation problems. See Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,
504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, sub nom., Forth Corp. v. Allegheny Air-
lines, Inc. 421 U.S. 978 (1975), on remand, Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States,
420 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D. Ind. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part Kohr v. Allegheny
Airlines, Inc., 586 F 2d 53 (7th Cir. 1978).
" H.R. 1027, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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sions of courts of competent jurisdiction,"' 95 was criticized by
Daniel Meador, a professor of law at the University of Vir-
ginia School of Law." Professor Meador recommended that
any legislation include standards of liability and remedies for
damages incurred. He attacked the "consensus" language as
vague to the point of being potentially burdensome on the
federal court system.
To eliminate the "consensus" reference, the Senate Com-
merce, Science and Transportation Committee adopted a
more definite standard in the proposed Kasten Billn 7 If en-
acted, this bill will specify standards for imposing liability on
product manufacturers and sellers while placing on the claim-
ant the burden of proof of breach of the standards "by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence"." The comparative rule stan-
dards are adopted for apportionment of damage awards
among joint tortfeasors, 99 and there is no reliance on a "con-
sensus of opinion." The companion Products Liability Act of
1982,100 the Shumway Bill, adopted a similar approach. The
Shumway Bill, unlike the Kasten Bill, however, did include an
affirmative defense for manufacturers that have complied with
either applicable government safety standards or mandatory
governmentally-imposed contract specifications. 10 1 Yet an-
other House bill, the LaFalce Bill, would have established
standards for state-enacted product liability legislation. 102 Al-
though all three bills seek uniformity of result and predict-
ability, their provisions are inconsistent with one another and
in many instances inconsistent with the approach of the
ATPA and the Danielson Bill.103 Therefore, it may be neces-
sary for conference committees to resolve these differences
before enactment in order to avoid legal challenges thereafter.
" Id. § 2751(a).
Testimony of Daniel J. Meador before the House Subcommittee on Administra-
tive Law and Governmental Relations, December 10, 1981.
S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
Id. § 4(a)(1).
Id. § 9(a).
'o H.R. 5214, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
101 Id. § 7.
H.R. 5261, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
o See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
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IV. INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR UNITED STATES AND
FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS
The CAB has adopted a new Part 205 for its economic regu-
lations which became effective February 23, 1982, and re-
quires all United States and foreign air carriers to maintain
certain minimum aircraft accident liability insurance in order
to continue to engage in air transportation in, to or from the
United States.1'0 New Part 205 requires all United States and
foreign air carriers to evidence their ability to pay damages
equal to at least $300,000 per passenger and $300,000 times 75
percent of the aircraft seating capacity for passengers per oc-
currence, as well as in third party damages for all operations
in, to and from the United States up to $20 million per occur-
rence. 05 Although there are less stringent requirements for
aircraft with a capacity of not more than 60 seats or 18,000
pounds maximum payload, the minimum required coverage
for these aircraft has been increased to $300,000 times 75 per-
cent of aircraft seating capacity for passengers and $2,000,000
per occurrence for third party liability coverage.106 Air taxi
operators registered under Part 294 of the CAB Regulations 0 7
are excluded from the new rule. A new rule, however, requires
that Canadian cross-border air taxi operators satisfy the same
insurance standards imposed upon as Part 294 carriers.108 The
insurance requirement may be satisfied by purchase of com-
mercial insurance policies, by self-insurance, or by any combi-
nation thereof. 0 9 All risks may be covered by a single
policy.10
Under the terms of new Part 205, carriers must file a certifi-
cate of insurance, signed by an authorized officer, agent or
representative of its insurer or insurance broker, on CAB
I" Aircraft Accident Liability Insurance, 14 C.F.R. § 205 (1982).
104 14 C.F.R. § 205.5 (1982).
10 Id.
107 Canadian Charter Air Taxi Operators, 14 C.F.R. § 294.10 (1982).
108 Aircraft Accident Liability Insurance, 14 C.F.R. § 205.6(0 (1982).
zo 14 C.F.R. § 205.3 (1982).
110 14 C.F.R. § 205.5 (1982). The CAB originally proposed a requirement that the
insurance be written by United States carriers. The final rule, however, allows for
coverage by foreign insurers duly licensed in their own countries.
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Form 205-A. 1 United States carriers must submit their cer-
tificate of insurance to the CAB's Special Authorities Division,
Bureau of Domestic Aviation, while foreign carriers must sub-
mit their proof to the Regulatory Affairs Division, Bureau of
International Aviation.' Insurance coverage may be pur-
chased from any United States licensed insurer or surplus line
insurer as well as from any insurer licensed by a foreign gov-
ernment. " If part of the coverage is provided by self-insur-
ance a summary of the self-insurance plan must be provided
to the appropriate office, and the carrier must file its complete
self-insurance plan with the Bureau of Carrier Accounts and
Audits. 14 The certificate of insurance may list all aircraft by
aircraft registration number or may provide for fleet cover-
age. " Any changes in the carrier's insurance coverage must
be reported to the CAB at least 10 days before the effective
date of the changes. Implementation of war risk exclusions,
however, may be activated by the insurer on shorter notice in
accordance with the terms of the policy, provided the CAB is
notified of the insurer's actions immediately."'
The new regulation also provides that an insurer may not
condition the liability coverage required by the terms of Part
205 (i) upon compliance with the terms of the insurance pol-
icy by the carrier, (ii) airline adherence to safety-related re-
quirements or (iii) assumption by the carrier of an agreement
to raise the liability limitations of the Convention. 1 7 The
CAB will, however, allow the insurer to recover from the car-
rier for payments made to beneficiaries under these provi-
sions.1  The CAB believes this will protect the passenger's
ability to collect damages from the carrier while allowing the
airline and its insurer to reach an agreement regarding the as-
" 14 C.F.R. § 205.3(d) (1982).
14 C.F.R. § 205.4 (1982).
14 C.F.R. § 205.3 (1982).
1. 14 C.F.R. § 205.4 (1982).
14 C.F.R. § 205.4 (1982).
14 C.F.R. § 205.7 (1982).
14 C.F.R. § 205.6 (1982).
I ld.
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sumption of risk as between themselves.11 9
The regulation requires a carrier to keep available for in-
spection by the CAB's staff, at the carrier's principal place of
business, the carrier's currently effective policy of insurance or
self-insurance.1 20 The carrier's current certificate of insurance
or summary of self-insurance, as filed with the CAB, must also
be available for public inspection at the carrier's principal
place of business.12 1 These requirements may conflict with the
provisions of certain "blocking" statutes enacted in various
foreign jurisdictions which typically prohibit the release of
commercial information by a citizen of that jurisdiction to for-
eign interests without approval of the government of the en-
acting jurisdiction.1 22
While there was some initial confusion regarding exactly
what aspects of carrier liability policies new Part 205 regu-
lates, the CAB has since stated that the carriers may negotiate
any and all other aspects of insurance with their insurers as
long as the minimum liability limits are maintained and the
policy cannot be voided by the insurer due to carrier
misconduct.23
. ER-1253, Feb. 23, 1982, p.7.
0 14 C.F.R. § 205.3 (1982).
1 Id.
Il A "blocking statute" typically prohibts a citizen or resident of the country en-
acting the law from providing information for use in litigation outside the home coun-
try without permission from an internal review body. Such laws have been enacted by
the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Germany and France among others.
"'3 Letter from David M. Kirstein, CAB General Counsel to Robert M. Kelly (Jan.
18, 1982).
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